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Abstract
This paper aims to explain the growth experiences of 14 major
states of India between 1980 and 1998. Using two measures of
convergence, s-convergence and û-convergence, we examine
whether per capita incomes in the states have been converging or
diverging. By both standards of convergence, India demonstrated
overall divergence during 1980–98, as well as during both the pre-
reform and post-reform subperiods. Interestingly, the richer states
experienced a degree of convergence during the post-reform pe-
riod, whereas the poorer states did not. Divergence was most no-
table within the poorer group of states. A remarkable 82 percent
of the cross-state variation in growth is explained by just the ur-
banization variable in India, with no hint of any conditional conver-
gence after controlling for the degree of urbanization. The regres-
sion estimate shows that a 10 percentage point higher rate of
urbanization is associated with 1.3 percentage points per year
higher rate of annual growth.
1. Introduction
India accounts for a meager 2.4 percent of the world’s sur-
face area, yet it sustains a whopping 16.7 percent of the
world’s population, amounting to a little over 1 billion
people residing in 28 states and 7 union territories. The
variation in physical geography, culture, and economic
conditions across these states and territories is enormous.
Some states have achieved rapid economic growth in re-
cent years, whereas others have languished. This paper
attempts to explain the differential economic performance
* This paper was prepared for the Asian Economic Panel meeting
held in Seoul, Korea, on 25–26 October 2001 and was presented
to the Prime Minister of India on 25 December 2001 in New
Delhi.
of India’s states, especially under the forces of globalization in the 1990s. The paper
may be read most pro tably as a companion to Démurger et al.’s recent work (2002)
on regional differences in China’s economic performance.
We focus on the 14 most populous states in India, which excludes the Himalayan
states, the northeastern states, and the 7 union territories (UTs). The included states
have a combined population of 897 million (approximately 90 percent of India’s
population) and cover 2.7 million km2 (83 percent of India’s total land area). Some
important data for the 14 states are listed in table 1, and the states’ locations are
shown in  gure 1. Economic performance varies greatly among the 14 states. The
gross state domestic product (GSDP) per capita ranges from 1,261 rupees per month
in 1997–98 in the poorest state, Bihar (population 82 million), to 5,690 rupees per
month in the richest state, Maharashtra (population 96 million). Some states have
achieved rapid economic growth in recent years, such as Gujarat, with growth in
state per capita income at 7.8 percent per year from 1992–93 to 1998–99, whereas
others have languished, such as Bihar, at20.2 percent per year over the same period.
The differential economic performance across states raises important policy ques-
tions. To what extent are the differences a manifestation of global economic forces
acting upon India, especially during a period of economic liberalization, and to
what extent do they re ect differences in economic policies at the local and national
levels? Will market reforms tend to make the rich states richer in relative terms or
will they lead to economic convergence across states? Speci cally, are the poorest
states (especially the so-called BIMARU states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan,
and Uttar Pradesh) condemned to fall farther behind the front-runners, at least in
relative terms?
Démurger et al. (2002) found that the underlying drivers of economic growth in
China, and hence the tendencies toward convergence or divergence, differed mark-
edly across subperiods as a result of major shifts in the economic policy regime. In
1978–84, during the  rst phase of China’s market reforms, the dismantling of the
communes and the partial liberalization of food production gave a great boost to
major food-producing regions. By the late 1980s, international trade became the
major driver of economic growth, and the coastal regions outpaced the interior
provinces.
Policy regimes have also affected economic growth in India. In the state planning
period up to 1991, international trade played only a minor role, and industrializa-
tion was heavily affected by state investment plans, which attempted (at least
mildly) to promote the laggard regions. The Green Revolution, which introduced
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Figure 1. Indian States
Source: Registrar General and Census Commissioner (2001).
Note: P = Pondicherry.
certain high-yield grain crops to India, led to sharp increases in grain productivity
in regions such as Punjab and Haryana, which were suited for the improved crops
(mainly wheat). In the market reform period after 1991, market forces and interna-
tional trade played a larger role in India’s economic growth, although India’s en-
trance into the global economy has been much less dramatic than China’s. We
would expect the coastal regions to have advantages over the interior regions after
1991 because they face much lower transactions costs in participating in global trade
and investment.
Several studies of high-income market economies, undertaken during the 1990s for
the United States, Japan, and regions within western Europe, found evidence for
strong convergence among regions (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, chap. 11). Sim-
ilar to the  ndings for China, we found little evidence of comparable convergence
among Indian states. In China and India, geographical variation across regions ap-
pears to block or slow the convergence of incomes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the results of previous studies
of convergence among Indian states during the period 1980–98, discusses measures
of convergence, and summarizes our conclusions on interstate convergence. In
section 3 we account for the lack of convergence, discussing the social and demo-
graphic factors that affect the economic performance of the 14 states under study. In
section 4, we attempt to unravel some mysteries at the state level. Policy implica-
tions and directions for future research are discussed in section 5.
2. Convergence among Indian states (1980–98)
2.1 Previous studies of convergence across Indian states
Several studies covering different time periods examine whether per capita income
levels have been converging or diverging in India, and most  nd a tendency toward
divergence rather than convergence. Nair (1971)  nds no noticeable reduction in in-
terstate income differentials between 1950 and 1960,1 and Chaudhury (1974) con-
cludes that the degree of state income inequality did not change between 1950 and
1970. Majumdar and Kapoor (1980) suggest that interstate inequalities of income in
India steadily increased during 1962–76.
Rao, Shand, and Kalirajan (1999) suggest that per capita state domestic product
(SDP) in the Indian states has tended to diverge rather than converge. Per capita
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1 Nair concludes that neither changes in the degree of industrialization nor changes in labor
productivity helped reduce income disparities.
SDP growth is positively related to the initial levels of income. States with better in-
frastructure and human resources have been able to attract more investment in the
post-reform era. Dasgupta et al. (2000) also report a distinct tendency for per capita
SDP in Indian states to have diverged during 1960–95.2 Kurian (2000)  nds widen-
ing regional disparities among the Indian states and a clear dichotomy between
what he calls the forward and backward states. The forward states have higher lev-
els of per capita income, better infrastructure, higher per capita resource  ows and
private investment, and better social and demographic indicators.
In contrast, Dholakia’s (1994) analysis of 20 Indian states over the period 1960–90
 nds marked tendencies of convergence of long-term GSDP growth rates.3 This ap-
pears to be a result of including the 5 special-category Indian states4 and Delhi with
the 14 major Indian states. Cashin and Sahay (1996) also reach similar conclusions,
 nding absolute convergence in a study of 20 states over the period 1961–91.
Ahluwalia (2001) analyzes the economic performance of the Indian states during the
post-reform period and suggests that not all the richest states got richer relative to
poorer states; for example, Punjab and Haryana were the two richest states in 1990–
91, but their per capita SDP growth rates in the 1990s not only were lower than in
the 1980s, but actually fell below the national average. Ahluwalia also points out
that two poor states, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, had performed well in terms
of growth over the 1980s, but he does not offer an explanation for this result.
In general, the studies that focus on the most populous states uncover little evidence
of convergence, although there may be some convergence of the small northeastern
states with the rest of the country. Our study, which is based on data from the 14
most populous states and leaves aside the question of the northeastern areas, simi-
larly  nds evidence of overall divergence rather than convergence.
2.2 Measures of convergence
There are two standard ways of examining the presence or absence of unconditional
convergence (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, 383–87). The  rst measure is s-conver-
gence. We measure the standard deviation across regions of the logarithm of the real
GSDP per capita. There is s-convergence if the standard deviation across states tends
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2 In terms of the shares of the different sectors within each state’s SDP, Dasgupta et al. (2000)
 nd a tendency for increasing similarity across states in sectoral composition.
3 Dholakia identi es 1980 as the turning point when several of the lagging states started grow-
ing and the leading states began to stagnate.
4 Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, and Tripura are classi ed as spe-
cial-category states by the Planning Commission because of their mountainous terrain.
to decline over time. The second measure is b-convergence. Here we regress the pro-
portionate growth in per capita SDP on the logarithm of initial income. There is
b-convergence if the coef cient of initial income, denoted b, is negative and statisti-
cally signi cant.
In addition to looking at s-convergence and b-convergence across the 14 states, we
also divide the states into two groups based on GSDP per capita and examine con-
vergence within these two subgroups.5 Group I includes the high-income states of
Maharashtra, Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Karnataka, and
Kerala. Group II includes the poor states of Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, and Bihar. Table 2 shows that the states in group I
ranked within the top eight positions in GSDP per capita in all the years in
question.6
-convergence measure Figure 2 shows the standard deviation across the states
of the log of real GSDP per capita. We can see that the 14 states as a group show an
increasing standard deviation between 1980 and 1990 and an increased rise in that
standard deviation in the post-reform period. There was an overall rise in inequality
of 2.40 percent per annum between 1980 and 1998. Of the two periods within that
time frame, the 1992–98 period experienced the most divergence: 2.14 percent
per annum compared to 1.24 percent per annum in 1980–90. Thus there was no
s-convergence during either of the periods in question.
Group II states exhibited much greater volatility in dispersion than group I states, in
addition to exhibiting the greater absolute dispersion (even though group II states
started off with considerably lower standard deviations). This is the case for both
periods. From 1980 to 1990, group I states experienced an increase in dispersion of
a mere 1.24 percent per annum compared to 2.51 percent per annum within the
group II states. During 1992–98, group I states exhibited a decrease in dispersion of
0.35 percent per annum, whereas group II states witnessed an increase of 4.61 per-
cent per annum. Thus, the richer states experienced a degree of convergence during
the post-reform period, whereas the poorer states did not.
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5 We have used only states with populations above 10 million. Delhi is not included (despite
having a huge population) because it suffers/bene ts from factors related to being the capi-
tal city. Assam is not included because of incomplete data.
6 All data in this paper (unless otherwise indicated) are calculated from the Economic and Po-
litical Weekly Research Foundation’s National Accounts Statistics of India 1950–51 to 1996–97
(EPWRF 1998). GSDP per capita levels for 1997–98 and 1998–99 are calculated from
Ahluwalia (2001).
-convergence measure The lack of s-convergence is mirrored by a lack of
b-convergence. Thus, there is a positive coef cient on initial income in table 3,
which shows the results of regressions of the growth during each subperiod on the
log of initial income. Regressions are given for 1980–98, 1980–90, and 1991–98.
During 1980–90, growth patterns were divergent. The state with the highest GSDP
per capita in 1980 was Punjab (Rs3,020 per month), and the state with the lowest
GSDP per capita was Bihar (Rs1,062 per month). From 1980–81 to 1990–91, Punjab’s
growth rate was 3.78 percent per annum and Bihar’s was 2.94 percent per annum.
Punjab was the 6th-fastest-growing state and Bihar the 10th. In general, the richest
states had the highest growth rates (see table 4). The only notable exception is
Rajasthan, which had the second-lowest initial GSDP per capita level but was the
fastest-growing state during the 1980s. Apart from Rajasthan, all states grew in a
manner that perpetuated divergent trends during the pre-reform period.
Do states exhibit convergent trends during the post-reform period? The fastest-
growing state is Maharashtra, but it also has one of the highest GSDP levels of the 14
states. Overall there is a signi cant positive relationship between initial income in
1990 and growth during the 1990s, indicating divergence. The regression evidence
suggests that b-divergence was especially marked for group I states in the post-
reform period.
39 Asian Economic Papers
Understanding Regional Economic Growth in India
Figure 2. Standard deviation (StDev) of log real per capita GSDP for group I, group II, and
all states
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Table 2. Fourteen Indian states ranked according to GSDP per capita levels (highest income
= 1, lowest income 14)
1980–81 1991–92 1996–97 1998–99
1 Punjab Punjab Maharashtra Maharashtra
2 Maharashtra Haryana Punjab Punjab
3 Haryana Maharashtra Haryana Gujarat
4 Gujarat Gujarat Gujarat Haryana
5 West Bengal Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu
6 Kerala Karnataka West Bengal West Bengal
7 Karnataka West Bengal Karnataka Karnataka
8 Tamil Nadu Kerala Kerala Kerala
9 Andhra Pradesh Andhra Pradesh Rajasthan Rajasthan
10 Madhya Pradesh Rajasthan Andhra Pradesh Andhra Pradesh
11 Uttar Pradesh Uttar Pradesh Madhya Pradesh Madhya Pradesh
12 Orissa Madhya Pradesh Uttar Pradesh Uttar Pradesh
13 Rajasthan Orissa Orissa Orissa
14 Bihar Bihar Bihar Bihar
Table 3. -convergence regressions (Dependent variable: growth rate)
1980–98 1980–90 1991–98
Log of initial per capita real GSDP
(All) 2.0 (2.54) 1.23 (1.09) 2.91 (1.91)
Log of initial per capita real GSDP
(group I) 20.2 (0.18) 1.32 (0.86) 9.34 (3.47)
Log of initial per capita real GSDP
(group II) 4.4 (1.51) 20.66 (0.11) 21.74 (0.62)










Growth rate of per
capita GSDP from
1992–93 to 1998–99
Punjab 3.8 Punjab 2.8
Maharashtra 4.3 Haryana 2.6
Haryana 4.6 Maharashtra 6.8
Gujarat 3.8 Gujarat 7.8
West Bengal 2.3 Tamil Nadu 5.0
Kerala 2.5 Karnataka 3.5
Karnataka 3.6 West Bengal 4.8
Tamil Nadu 5.0 Kerala 4.6
Andhra Pradesh 2.9 Andhra Pradesh 3.7
Madhya Pradesh 2.9 Rajasthan 4.4
Uttar Pradesh 3.0 Uttar Pradesh 1.6
Orissa 1.0 Madhya Pradesh 3.9
Rajasthan 5.8 Orissa 1.6
Bihar 2.9 Bihar 20.2
Unweighted average 3.5 Unweighted average 3.8
In table 5 we decompose the interstate variance of income as equal to the variance
within groups I and II and the variance between the two groups.7 The method used
for calculating variance decomposition is described in the technical appendix. From
1980 to 1990, variance increased within groups I and II, as well as between the two
groups. From 1992 to 1998, there was a smaller increase in dispersion in overall vari-
ance of 20.2 percent, compared with 35.5 percent in the earlier period.8 Over the
whole period there was an increase in dispersion within group I of a mere 0.8 per-
cent per annum, whereas the dispersion within group II increased by 17.17 percent
per annum. There was also an increase in the dispersion of average incomes be-
tween the two groups of 3.83 percent per annum. Thus, we conclude that the in-
crease in overall dispersion during the second period was driven by increased dis-
persion within the group II states.
Conclusions on interstate convergence By both standards of convergence, India
demonstrated overall divergence during 1980–98 and during the pre-reform and
post-reform subperiods. Divergence was most notable within the poorer group of
states. This  nding is consistent with the experience of China in the post-reform
period but differs from the  ndings for the United States, Japan, and European
regions.
3. Economic performance of the states
We hypothesize that regional differences in growth re ect regional differences in the
marginal productivity of investments by subsector. To some extent the relative re-
turns to investment in each subsector depend on the general business environment,
but to an important extent they also depend on speci c geographical factors. Some
of these geographical considerations are listed in table 6.
Agriculture can occasionally be a leading sector in economic growth, as a result of
either a spurt in agricultural productivity or increased cash crop exports. In India,
agricultural productivity–led growth occurred in one major historical period, the
Green Revolution, dating from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. The Green Revolu-
tion originated from the introduction of short-stemmed, high-yield wheat, and to a
lesser extent, paddy rice.  These crops depended on irrigation and intensive applica-
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7 The variance decomposition is calculated as follows: overall variance = a (within group I
variance) + b (within group II variance) + c (average between group I and group II vari-
ances). The constants a, b, and c are weights that depend on the number of states in each
group (see technical appendix for a more detailed explanation).
8 We omitted 1991 because it represents a structural break in the data resulting from the eco-
nomic crisis in India.
tions of fertilizer.9 The epicenter of the Green Revolution was in Punjab and
Haryana, and to a lesser extent other states of the North Indian Plains (as far east as
Bihar) and southward to Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Maharashtra. High-yielding rice
varieties made the most impact in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. Note that China,
like India, experienced one short-lived burst of agriculture-led growth during the
dismantling of the communes; food output jumped during 1978–84.
Almost all the regions among the group II states (except perhaps much of western
Rajasthan and parts of western Madhya Pradesh and southern Uttar Pradesh) have
the agro-climatic potential to yield high returns in agriculture because of reasonable
to high rainfall and availability of perennial river waters. The poverty in these states
is a consequence of human failure rather than of natural factors. Although it may be
useful to identify states with high or low incidences of poverty, there are states with
high variations within them owing to historical and economic antecedents and agro-
climatic factors. This is typically true of the larger states, though such variations ex-
ist in smaller states as well.
A more disaggregated National Sample Survey (NSS) region-wise picture of poverty
(head count ratio) shows that there are signi cant heterogeneities in poverty in each
state except perhaps Bihar, which is uniformly poor. Sharp contrasts are witnessed
in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra, though variations can be seen in
smaller states like Haryana and Punjab as well. The regions can be segregated ac-
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Table 5. Variance decomposition within and between group I and group II states
Within group I Within group II
Between group I
and group II Overall variance
1980 0.00576 0.00131 0.00187 0.00894
1981 0.00618 0.00162 0.00206 0.00986
1982 0.00672 0.00185 0.00226 0.01083
1983 0.00683 0.00162 0.00223 0.01067
1984 0.00608 0.00084 0.00183 0.00874
1985 0.00765 0.00096 0.00228 0.01089
1986 0.00748 0.00060 0.00213 0.01021
1987 0.00699 0.00125 0.00218 0.01041
1988 0.00765 0.00158 0.00244 0.01167
1989 0.00784 0.00184 0.00256 0.01224
1990 0.00744 0.00214 0.00253 0.01211
1991 0.00661 0.00194 0.00226 0.01081
1992 0.00698 0.00320 0.00269 0.01286
1993 0.00624 0.00307 0.00246 0.01177
1994 0.00624 0.00374 0.00264 0.01262
1995 0.00606 0.00427 0.00273 0.01307
1996 0.00648 0.00488 0.00300 0.01435
1997 0.00654 0.00523 0.00311 0.01487
1998 0.00664 0.00559 0.00323 0.01546
9 Most rice farmers were too poor to introduce the high-yield varieties of rice, which required
substantial applications of fertilizer, as well as irrigation.  Also, the taste of the rice was unfa-
miliar, and public acceptance was limited.  Therefore, rice became the “orphan” of the Green
Revolution (Tirtha 2000, 268).
cording to their poverty levels: low (up to 20 percent), medium (21–40 percent), high
(41–60 percent), and very high (more than 60 percent). Southern Bihar, southern
Orissa, southwestern Madhya Pradesh, and southern Uttar Pradesh fall in the very-
high-poverty bracket. These regions are composed of the districts in Chotanagpur
and Santhal Parganas in Bihar; Koraput and Phulbhani districts in Orissa; the Jhansi
region in Uttar Pradesh; and its adjacent regions in Madhya Pradesh, including
Betul, Khandwa, and Hoshangabad. These regions are either mainly tribal (except
Jhansi) or rocky and dry, yet densely populated because of their agro-climatic fea-
tures. The main inference drawn is that tribal areas are predominantly and distinctly
poor.
The areas of high poverty are in Bihar, portions of Madhya Pradesh, inland
Maharashtra, northern Tamil Nadu, eastern and central Uttar Pradesh, and parts of
West Bengal. These are generally tribal, thickly populated, semi-arid areas, and
those areas that have been neglected historically are poor. West Bengal has made
strides in poverty alleviation in some areas. Medium-level poverty persists in re-
gions of the western states, and a few regions have made more progress than others
compared to the eastern ones, where there is uniform poverty. Typical examples are
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. Pockets of low pov-
erty include the western coastal regions, all of Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, and parts of
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, which form a north-south belt that was affected by
the Green Revolution.
The manufacturing sector is a much more consistent engine of growth that has
likely played a growing role since 1991 with the opening of the economy. As China’s
experience demonstrates, trade liberalization in a low-wage, surplus-labor environ-
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Table 6. Some regional factors in sectoral growth
Key determinants






































Note: ICT = information-communication technology.
ment permits a rapid expansion of export-oriented industry that can absorb a large
number of workers to provide goods for the world market. India’s insertion into the
world economy has been much less dramatic and successful than China’s. The share
of exports of goods and services in GNP was stable at 7 percent in 1980 and 1990; it
rose to 11 percent in 1999, after the reforms (World Bank 1997; 2001, table 13). In
China the comparable share rose from 6 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 1990 and to
22 percent in 1999. Several factors may account for these differences: China’s re-
forms were bolder in promoting both foreign direct investment (FDI) and manufac-
tured exports (Bajpai and Sachs 2000), and China bene ted from the vast in ows of
FDI from overseas Chinese investors, especially from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Southeast Asia.
The most likely site for sustained manufacturing growth in India, as in China, is
along the coast, especially at the four large port cities of Mumbai (Maharashtra),
Kolkata (West Bengal), Chennai (Tamil Nadu), and Kandla (Gujarat). Coastal, ur-
ban-based industry can serve both the internal market and the international market,
and can more readily make logistical links with foreign suppliers and customers
than can interior-based enterprises. New export-oriented units (EOUs) are therefore
heavily concentrated on the coast (table 7). Manufacturers in interior regions can of
course service the domestic market, particularly in consumer goods such as pro-
cessed foods, but the potential for rapid growth based on the internal market tends
to be more limited than the potential growth based on exports to the world market.
For this reason we have seen much faster growth in coastal China than in the
interior.
The tourist sector can also be a source of export-led growth, but in a country the size
of India, it is likely to play a secondary role except in some local niches. Tourist po-
tential is very much geographically determined, as it depends on the physical envi-
ronment, the presence of historical sites, and easy access to transport nodes, espe-
cially international airports. Rajasthan has been the state with the most signi cant
growth and scale of the tourist industry because of the popularity of Jaipur and
Udaipur and its proximity to Delhi.
High-tech services, such as information- and communications-based industry (e.g.,
software production) or  nancial services, usually rely on a network of universities
and an urban labor market. These sectors are much less dependent on coastal access
because much of their business can be transacted by telephone or via the Internet. A
high quality of life of the location, as an attraction for highly mobile skilled workers,
is probably more important for these service sectors than for other sectors of the
economy. The most important state for service-sector activities is Maharashtra; it
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combines the country’s  nancial center with an important information technology
(IT)-based industry. Other key states include Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Delhi, and to a
lesser extent Andhra Pradesh (see table 8).
Foreign investors have various motivations: to service the domestic market; to ex-
ploit site-speci c natural resources (e.g., mining); and, in low-wage countries, to es-
tablish export platforms in labor-intensive goods, in labor-intensive stages of the
production process, or in standardized technologies that are easily transferable to
lower-wage settings. Coastal access is a huge bene t for all export platform manu-
facturing, as we have seen clearly in the case of China. FDI is also attracted to urban
areas and to regions with natural-resource deposits. Interior cities (such as
Bangalore and Hyderabad) may be suitable for IT-based activities that do not de-
pend on coastal access.  Although the data on state-by-state FDI are spotty, table 9
shows the cumulative FDI approvals by state, on an aggregate and per capita basis,
for 1991–2001.  The following simple regression con rms that FDI as a percentage of
GSDP  owed mainly to the urbanized states and to the states with large mining sec-
tors (especially Orissa and, to a lesser extent, Madhya Pradesh).10
FDI per capita5 24,6821 220 (% urban) 1 459 (% mining in GSDP)
(4.04)                     (2.03)
N 5 14; R2 5 0.62
These considerations suggest that urbanization is likely to have been a key determi-
nant of economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, because existing urban areas were
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Table 7. Distribution of export-oriented units (August 1991 to May 2001)





Andhra Pradesh 404 11.0 5.3
Bihar 7 0.2 0.1
Gujarat 458 12.4 9.1
Haryana 206 5.6 9.8
Karnataka 376 10.2 7.1
Kerala 72 2.0 2.3
Madhya Pradesh 136 3.7 2.3
Maharashtra 563 15.3 5.8
Orissa 41 1.1 1.1
Punjab 127 3.5 5.2
Rajasthan 205 5.6 3.6
Tamil Nadu 547 14.8 8.8
Uttar Pradesh 206 5.6 1.2
West Bengal 98 2.7 1.2
Source: Secretariat for Industrial Approvals (SIA) Newsletter, June 2001, Ministry of Industry, Government of India.
Note: Group I states are in boldface type.
10 The dependent variable is cumulative approvals of FDI in rupees per capita.
the preferred location for new investments in manufacturing and services. As we
see in table 10, the extent of urbanization varies widely among the states, from a low
of 13 percent in Bihar and Orissa to 39 percent in Maharashtra (as of 1991), with the
relative proportions of urbanization by state relatively constant over the past 30
years. The degree of urbanization itself depends on underlying geographical factors,
especially the location of the main national ports and the productivity of agriculture
in the region. Regions of high agricultural productivity tend to support a larger pro-
portion of the local population in an urban setting, whereas regions of low agricul-
tural productivity tend to have a high proportion of the population in peasant, sub-
sistence agriculture. Empirically, we  nd that two factors account for two-thirds of
the variation in urbanization rates across the 14 states: having a major port (e.g., in
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Table 8. Software exports by state, 1995–96
State
Value of software exports
(Rs, millions)
Software exports per capita
(Rs, millions)











Tamil Nadu 3,116.7 53.3
Uttar Pradesh — —
West Bengal — —
Source: http://www.maharashtra.gov.in/english/invest/softw.htm (accessed as of 4 April 1999).
Note: Group I states are in boldface type.
Table 9. Flows of foreign direct investment to Indian states





(1991–2001 per 2001 population)











Tamil Nadu 222,804 3,587
Uttar Pradesh 42,048 253
West Bengal 84,235 1,050
Source: Secretariat for Industrial Approvals (SIA) Newsletter, August 2001, Ministry of Industry, Government of India.
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and Gujarat) and having a dry steppe cli-
mate (Bs) suitable for wheat production.11
Urbanization (%) in 19915 19.41 11.1 (major port)1 12.6 (% population in Bs climate)
(9.9) (4.1) (2.8)
N 5 14; R2 5 0.68
The rate of growth of GSDP per capita is highly correlated with the extent of urban-
ization at the beginning of the period in question. The results of six regressions are
shown in table 11. In a regression of growth for 1980–98 on initial income in 1980
and urbanization as of 1981, the urbanization coef cient is highly signi cant, with a
coef cient of 0.13 and a t-statistic of 5.3 (regression 1). A remarkable 82 percent of
the cross-state variation in growth is explained by this variable alone, with no hint
of any conditional convergence, after controlling for the degree of urbanization. The
regression shows that a 10 percentage point higher rate of urbanization is associated
with 1.3 percentage points of higher annual growth. A simple bivariate regression
without initial income shows the same results (regression 2). The relationship be-
tween 1981 urbanization [e(urban81|X)] and growth [e(gr8098|X)] during 1980–98
is shown in  gure 3.
During 1980–90 the Green Revolution continued to play a role in growth differen-
tials across states.  To capture the effect of the Green Revolution, we construct a
dummy variable equal to 1.0 in Punjab and Haryana (the epicenter of the areas
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Table 10. Rates of urbanization
1971 1981 1991
Andhra Pradesh 19.3 (7) 23.3 (7) 26.8 (7)
Bihar 10.0 (13) 12.5 (13) 13.2 (14)
Gujarat 28.1 (3) 31.1 (3) 34.4 (2)
Haryana 17.7 (8) 21.9 (8) 24.8 (9)
Karnataka 24.3 (5) 28.9 (4) 30.9 (4)
Kerala 16.2 (11) 18.7 (11) 26.4 (8)
Madhya Pradesh 16.3 (10) 20.3 (10) 23.2 (10)
Maharashtra 31.2 (1) 35.0 (1) 38.7 (1)
Orissa 8.4 (14) 11.8 (14) 13.4 (13)
Punjab 23.7 (6) 27.7 (5) 29.7 (5)
Rajasthan 17.6 (9) 21.1 (9) 22.9 (11)
Tamil Nadu 30.3 (2) 33.0 (2) 34.2 (3)
Uttar Pradesh 14.0 (12) 18.0 (12) 19.9 (12)
West Bengal 24.8 (4) 26.5 (6) 27.4 (6)
Source: Registrar General and Census Commissioner (1981, 1991).
Note: Group I states are in boldface type. Figures in parentheses indicate relative rankings.
11 The major port variable takes the value of 1 for the states Maharashtra, West Bengal, Tamil
Nadu, and Gujarat, and 0 otherwise.  The Bs variable is the proportion of the population
(0 to 100 percent) living in the Bs climate zone of the Koeppen-Geiger climate classification.
where the high-yield wheat is grown), 0.25 in Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan,
and 0 elsewhere.  This variable has a coef cient of 3.54 (t = 4.01) in the growth re-
gression for the period 1980–90, holding constant the initial income and the degree
of urbanization in 1981.  Rajasthan is an outlier in this regression, with growth more
than one percentage point per year faster than is otherwise explained (table 11, re-
gression 3).  This may be attributable to the boom in tourism, or to the rapid
electri cation of the state in the 1980s, or to a more signi cant effect of the Green
Revolution than is captured by the value 0.25, or to some other unmeasured effect.
Interestingly, if one holds constant the urbanization variable, the Green Revolution
variable, and the Rajasthan dummy variable, there is evidence of conditional con-
vergence, with the slower states achieving faster growth than the richer states.  This
is the only regression result in which we  nd this conditional convergence.
By the 1990s the Green Revolution effect has disappeared entirely, as has the condi-
tional convergence and the fast growth of Rajasthan (regression 4).12 The only vari-
able that accounts for cross-state growth in the 1990s is urbanization as of 1991 (re-
gression 5), with a point estimate of the urbanization coef cient that is somewhat
higher than the coef cient for the 1980s (0.30 compared with 0.13). A simple
bivariate regression of growth in the 1991–98 period on urbanization in 1991 is also
shown (regression 6), with this single variable accounting for 71 percent of the varia-
tion. Economic liberalization may have added to the growth-promoting bene ts of
urbanization, especially for the coastal cities and the main cities engaged in IT ex-
ports (e.g., Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, and Delhi).
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Table 11. Growth equations, 1980–98
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6
Period 1980–98 1980–98 1980–90 1991–98 1991–98 1991–98
Ln (initial income) 20.04 24.68 0.08 21.83
(0.08) (3.29) (0.02) (1.35)
Urbanization 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.30 0.23
(5.30) (7.31) (5.30) (2.09) (4.75) (5.38)
Green Revolution 3.54 21.27
(4.01) (0.48)
Rajasthan dummy 1.56 1.61
(2.43) (1.24)
Constant 0.39 0.05 33.17 23.29 10.25 22.33
(0.09) (0.12) (3.37) (0.12) (1.09) (1.98)
R2 0.82 0.82 0.88 0.79 0.75 0.71
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. For the equations beginning in 1980, urbanization in 1981 is used; for the regressions be-
ginning in 1991, urbanization in 1991 is used.
12 The coefficient of the dummy variable for Rajasthan is still positive but is no longer statisti-
cally significant.
Consistent with our view of urban-led (and export-led) growth during the past de-
cade, we  nd that the gap between urban and rural expenditure per capita has wid-
ened in the past decade. Table 12 shows the urban/rural expenditure ratios by state
for 1987–88 and 1999–2000 and the percentage change of these ratios in the two peri-
ods. Simple regression analysis (not shown) con rms that the urban/rural ratio in
1999–2000 is higher in the more urbanized states and lower in the states that
bene ted most from the Green Revolution (Punjab and Haryana). The increase in
these ratios is highest in the urbanized states, although Bihar is an outlier because it
has a large increase in the urban/rural ratio but a relatively low level of urbaniza-
tion. This result has also recently been reported by Radhakrishna (2002, 248): “The
bene ts of better income growth during the 1990s seem to have bene ted the urban
areas more than the rural, thus aggravating the urban-rural divide.” Radhakrishna
also cites Bhalla’s (2000) result that employment growth during the 1990s was con-
centrated in urban areas.
Since the initiation of economic reforms in 1991, Indian states have competed with
each other to attract private investment, both domestic and foreign. Within states,
the investment has tended to  ow to the urban areas. State-level data on FDI ap-
provals (aggregate FDI approvals between 1991 and 2001) suggest that the relatively
fast-moving reformers have attracted higher levels of FDI (see table 9). Gujarat (pop-
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Figure 3. Relationship of urbanization (1981) and economic growth (1980–98)
ulation 50 million) received over a  fth of the private investment proposals, whereas
Bihar (population 83 million) barely managed a 5 percent share of such proposals.
Maharashtra and Gujarat accounted for 37 percent of the total investment proposals,
but Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh together were able
to attract only 26 percent of such proposals.
We have not been able to analyze the role of public sector investment in cross-state
growth, especially the central-government funds allocated to the state governments
in India’s  ve-year investment plans. The data we have collected to date are too
spotty for a serious analysis. There are hints that such investments have made a dif-
ference, at least in some places and times. The rapid electri cation of Rajasthan’s vil-
lages in the 1980s and 1990s (table 13) probably helps account for the otherwise un-
explained growth of that state.
3.1 Accounting for the lack of convergence
It is surprising, but robustly the case, that after controlling for urbanization alone
there is no evidence whatsoever of conditional convergence. We did not  nd any
candidate explanatory variables that, once they were controlled for, allowed signs of
conditional convergence to emerge. This poses a major issue of interpretation. Why
is it that the U.S. states displayed unconditional convergence in most decades of U.S.
history, as did Japanese prefectures and European regions, but India and China do
not show signs of conditional convergence, much less unconditional convergence?
There are several possible hypotheses for the lack of unconditional convergence:
1. The geographical differences are larger in India and China than in the United
States, Europe, and Japan.
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Table 12. Ratio of urban to rural expenditures, 1987–88 and 1999–2000 (total expenditures)
State TE U/R 1987–88 TE U/R 1999–2000 Percentage change
Andhra Pradesh 1.438 1.705 18.567
Bihar 1.365 1.563 14.505
Gujarat 1.493 1.617 8.305
Haryana 1.173 1.277 8.866
Karnataka 1.494 1.823 22.021
Kerala 1.259 1.218 23.256
Madhya Pradesh 1.662 1.727 3.910
Maharashtra 1.739 1.959 12.651
Orissa 1.766 1.657 26.172
Punjab 1.106 1.210 9.403
Rajasthan 1.338 1.450 8.371
Tamil Nadu 1.613 1.890 17.173
Uttar Pradesh 1.458 1.479 1.440
West Bengal 1.664 1.905 14.483
All India 1.581 1.759 11.259
Source: For 1987–88 the data are from National Sample Survey Organization (1991). For 1999–2000, the data are from National Sam-
ple Survey Organization (2001).
Note: TE U/R total expenditure urban/rural ratio.
2. Population movements in the United States, Europe, and Japan more readily ar-
bitrage differences across regions.
3. Policies of the national or regional governments have prevented convergence.
4. Economic convergence is easier at levels of economic development higher than
those present in China and India.
We  nd some merit in each of these possibilities. Certainly the intrinsic economic
advantages or disadvantages of Japanese prefectures and western European regions
are much smaller than those found in the different regions of either India or China.
Consider coastal access, for example (table 14). In Japan, 97 percent of the popula-
tion lives within 100 km of the coast. In the European Union, 51 percent of the popu-
lation lives within 100 km of the coast, and 89 percent lives within 100 km of the
coast or a sea-navigable waterway (e.g., the Rhine or the Danube).13 A surprisingly
high proportion of the U.S. population, 65 percent, lives within 100 km of the coast
or sea-navigable waterway.
One reason that the United States has such a high proportion of the population at
the coasts and along navigable waterways is that it has highly ef cient agriculture,
which can feed the entire population (and much more) with just 2 percent of the la-
bor force. For this reason, few people in the United States are “bound to the land,”
in the economic sense of needing to be in the place where food is grown. With much
lower food productivity in China and India (a re ection of the long history of much
higher man/land ratios in Asia), a much larger part of the population is needed to
produce food. This means that populations are “stuck” in the interior of the country
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Table 13. Percentage of villages with electricity
1985 1998 Change
Andhra Pradesh 83.95 97.03 13.08
Bihar 49.63 70.82 21.19
Gujarat 88.26 99.02 10.76
Haryana 100.00 100.00 0
Karnataka 83.14 98.65 15.51
Kerala 100.00 100.00 0
Madhya Pradesh 57.10 95.24 38.14
Maharashtra 92.84 100.00 7.16
Orissa 50.48 72.23 21.75
Punjab 99.49 100.00 0.51
Rajasthan 59.48 97.95 38.47
Tamil Nadu 99.73 99.94 0.21
Uttar Pradesh 56.03 78.11 22.08
West Bengal 50.43 77.11 26.68
All India 64.02 86.67 22.65
Source: 1985 data are from the Seventh Five Year Plan (1985–90), Planning Commission, Government of India, p. 164. 1998 data are
from Economic and Political Weekly, January 13, 2001.
Note: Group I states are in boldface type.
13 By sea-navigable waterway we mean that seagoing vessels may proceed up and down the
waterway to and from the sea.
and much less able to participate in international trade and globalized production
systems (e.g., outsourcing for multinational  rms). Large numbers of poor, near-
subsistence farmers live in the hinterland of China and India, in regions that are not
part of convergent growth except to the extent that households migrate in large
numbers.
Climatic variability is much lower in Europe, the United States, and Japan than it is
in India and China (see table 15). Substantial proportions of India’s population live
in tropical, arid, subtropical, and highland ecozones, whereas the overwhelming
proportion of U.S., European, and Japanese populations reside in temperate
ecozones. China also has large variations in climate, but only a small proportion of
China’s population lives in tropical ecozones, which have proved most dif cult for
development in other parts of the world (including India). Similar to the variation in
access to the sea, the climatic variation most likely puts a brake on cross-regional
convergence.
This brings us to the question of migration. In China, migration is limited by the
household registration system, which has blocked the legal migration of families
from the hinterland to urban areas. In India migration is not restricted, yet poor
families without social safety nets apparently face such high costs and risks associ-
ated with migration that internal labor  ows are not powerful enough to create
forces of convergence.14 In the case of China, the policy regime in the 1980s and
1990s favored the already-favored coastal provinces, and this accounted for part of
the continuing divergence between coastal and interior regions. In India, no such
preferential policies are readily discernible.
3.2 Social and demographic factors in convergence and divergence
We examined whether social and demographic factors could account for cross-state
growth patterns. The results were surprisingly negative. The states vary consider-
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Table 14. Proximity of population to coast
Region
Percentage of population
within 100 km of coast
Percentage of population





United States 35 65
European Union (EU 15) 51 90
Source: CID Geography Database (2001).
14 Exactly why this is the case is beyond the scope of this paper, but is certainly worthy of
much closer investigation.
ably in social indicators, such as infant mortality rates (tables 16 and 17). Generally,
the southern states have outperformed the northern states by a wide margin, and
Kerala has outperformed all states. However, this superior performance has not
translated into discernibly higher rates of economic growth at the state level.15
Kerala has reaped the returns of improving the literacy and health of its population:
migration has increased, and large amounts of remittance income have  owed back
to the state. This remittance income is counted as part of the state’s income but not
as part of its GSDP, which is the measure of economic development used in this
study. Thus, Keralites have a higher income standard than is measured by the pro-
duction within the state. We speculate on why this is so in the next section.
4. Unraveling some mysteries at the state level
This section explores four unusual aspects of state-level performance in India:
(1) the mediocre growth of Kerala, despite its excellent social indicators; (2) the rela-
tively fast growth of landlocked, arid Rajasthan; (3) the improved growth perfor-
mance of landlocked Madhya Pradesh; and (4) the poor growth performance of
coastal Orissa.
4.1 Kerala
During the period in question, Kerala has moved from sixth to eighth place in per
capita GSDP rankings; it grew at 2.5 percent between 1980 and 1990 and 4.6 percent
between 1992 and 1998. Although its growth performance has improved, making it
one of the biggest bene ciaries of the reform period (moving from the 12th- to the
6th-fastest-growing state), it is unclear why Kerala is not among the top states in
growth performance, given its outstanding results in health and education.
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(Cf Cs Dw Df E)
Highland
(H)
India 33 32 28 0 7
China 0 10 36 30 24
Japan 0 0 0 100 0
United States 0 0 19 70 10
European Union (15) 0 0 1 98 1
Source: CID Geography Database (2001), using Koeppen-Geiger climate classi cation.
Note: Aw = tropical wet and dry. Am = tropical monsoon. Bs = dry semiarid (steppe). Bw = dry arid (desert). Cf = humid subtropical,
coast. Cs = humid subtropical, mediterranean. Cw = humid subtropical, dry winters. Dw = continental mid-latitude, dry winters.
Df = continental mid-latitude, wet all seasons. E = polar. H = highland.
15 The simple correlation of growth with literacy is positive but it disappears once we control
for urbanization, which is correlated with growth and the degree of literacy.
Kerala has had a very small manufacturing base. In 1981, manufacturing as a per-
centage of GSDP was 13.9 percent; by 1991 that  gure had risen to a meager 15.5
percent. Subrahmanian (1990) argues that Kerala’s poor economic performance can
be attributed to a limited focus on the commodity production sector. The secondary
sector areas that have seen growth are construction and power, rather than areas in-
volving actual manufacturing activity. Resource-based industries do not generally
provide the growth potential of manufacturing (capital goods or demand-based) in-
dustries, in part because the latter are likely to lead to intersectoral linkages and
technical progress, whereas the former have a tendency to stagnate. The lopsided in-
dustrial structure of Kerala is a symptom, however, and not a cause, of its low level
of growth: the cause is insuf cient public and private investment and a lack of effec-
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Table 16. Infant mortality rate (deaths under age 1 per 1,000 live births)
State 1990 1998











Tamil Nadu 58 53
Uttar Pradesh 98 85
West Bengal 66 53
Source: EPWRF (2000).
Note: Group I states are in boldface type.
Table 17. Life expectancy at birth (years)
State 1981 1993











Tamil Nadu 57.4 64.4
Uttar Pradesh 48.5 56.0
West Bengal 58.0 62.8
All India 59.8 62.8
Source: Central Bureau of Health Intelligence, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India. 1994.
Note: Group I states are in boldface type.
tive government policies to encourage private investment.16 Kerala’s private invest-
ment is a mere 1.77 percent of GSDP, the lowest in India. Kerala also receives very
little FDI (see table 9).
The lack of FDI and private investment in Kerala is also the consequence of the rela-
tively hostile attitude of state government to private investment and of the highly
militant labor force. The Communist Party, which governed the state for many years
until 2001, had part of its base in the unions and hence did not resist the labor mili-
tancy. This reputation for aggressive labor tactics has discouraged private investors,
both domestic and foreign, over the years. The change in government to Congress
party rule may lead to an improved investment climate in the state.
It should be noted that in recent years Keralites working abroad (mainly in the Gulf
countries) have remitted about Rs6,000 crore17 annually, which is about one- fth of
Kerala’s domestic product and is three times greater than the budget support the
state receives from the central government. Between 1980 and 1995 more than
Rs31,350 crore  owed into the state from the Gulf.18 Since remittance income is
counted as part of the state’s income but is not included in its GSDP, Kerala may not
be as poor a state as its GSDP  gures suggest.
4.2 Rajasthan
Rajasthan recorded the highest overall growth in the pre-reform period (table 4). Its
agriculture, tourism, construction, and service sectors grew the most among all 14
states, and it was among the top three group II states in manufacturing growth.
What spurred Rajasthan’s incredible growth spurt in the 1980s? One part of the an-
swer is that Rajasthan received the highest per capita transfers and grants from the
union party government among the four BIMARU states. However, other states
(e.g., Orissa) also received large transfers but did not experience such successful eco-
nomic growth. Four additional factors probably contributed to Rajasthan’s high
growth: (1) the bene ts of the Green Revolution in the wheat-growing areas of the
state, (2) the positive impact on agriculture from the construction of Rajasthan’s
Command Canal in the early 1980s, (3) the tremendous increase in tourism during
the 1980s and 1990s, and (4) the rapid electri cation of the state that took place in
the 1980s.
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16 There are also historical reasons for Kerala’s pattern of industrial development, but they are
beyond the scope of this work.
17 One crore equals 10 million rupees.
18 M. G. Radhakrishnan, India Today, 1 May 2000.
4.3 Madhya Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh increased democratic participation in the 1990s, making it the state
with the highest degree of direct democracy. Madhya Pradesh was the  rst state to
hold elections to panchayats in 1994 (Behar 2001).The goal was to give power to the
people directly rather than to their representatives. Kumar (2001) explains how em-
powering the people has enabled the government to overcome dif cult situations
such as water shortages. The state supplies the panchayats with funding and techni-
cal support in order to “widen, de-silt and deepen village ponds, dig new wells and
build dam checks” (Kumar 2001, 18). The state government has moved toward a su-
pervisory rather than a directly administrative role.
The extent to which enhanced democratization has aided growth is unclear. One
would expect the reforms resulting from direct democracy to operate in the long
term rather than the short term. Possibly, increased growth occurred because the re-
forms were well targeted and effectively implemented.
4.4 Orissa
Orissa has traditionally been one of India’s poorest states. It had the third-lowest
GSDP per capita in 1980 and was also the slowest-growing state in the 1980s (1 per-
cent per annum), which is partly attributable to its even lower agricultural growth
(0.72 percent).  It is unclear why agricultural production has fared so poorly, given
that its soil quality and irrigation are on par with those of the more successful states.
Orissa’s mines and quarries are the most productive in India, and their output grew
by 15.6 percent during 1980–90, adding to the mystery of poor performance.
In the post-reform period, Orissa grew somewhat more rapidly than in its pre-
reform phase (1.6 and 1.0 percent, respectively), but it was near the bottom of the
states in growth performance (12th during 1991–98 and 14th during 1980–90). To
some extent Orissa became an innovator in economic reforms: it was the  rst state to
reform its power sector, it has strongly set out industrial policy promoting private
sector investment and offering  scal and other concessions, and it was the  rst state
to announce new agricultural and tourism policies.
In the post-liberalization period, Orissa ranks sixth in foreign investment. This is the
result of a change in the state’s economic policy, which has directed investors to-
ward Orissa’s abundant natural resources. As Singh (1997) observed, “Orissa has 90
percent of India’s chrome ore and nickel reserves; 70 percent of bauxite; and 24 per-
cent of coal reserves. With no other state having such abundance of natural reources,
the big business houses have no option but to set up steel, alumina and coal based
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power projects in Orissa only.” Orissa’s post-reform ability to attract both private
and foreign investment suggests that its pre-reform failure was primarily a result of
ineffective or nonexistent industrial policies to exploit its mineral wealth.
It is unclear why Orissa’s agriculture sector has grown so poorly. In the post-reform
period, the sector declined further, experiencing a contraction of 0.5 percent. One
explanation may be Orissa’s vulnerability to  oods and devastation from tropical
cyclones. As Orissa is predominantly an agricultural state, its poor agricultural
performance augurs very badly for its future income growth and income distri-
bution.
5. Policy implications and directions for future research
The main  nding of this study is that the forces of convergence (absolute and condi-
tional) are very weak in the 14 Indian states examined. We expect that growth will
continue to occur in those states in which urbanization is already high, perhaps be-
cause of coastal access or the relatively high productivity of agriculture. There is lit-
tle evidence to suggest that growth will equalize across regions. This assessment is
hardly a pessimistic one, however, for several reasons. First, there is much more po-
tential for growth in India than has been achieved to date. Whereas the per capita
growth rates in India’s states have varied between 2 and 8 percent per annum, the
per capita growth rates in China’s provinces have ranged between 8 and 13 percent
per annum during 1992–98 (Démurger et al. 2002, table 4). Many Indian coastal cit-
ies have not begun to attract foreign direct investment for export-led growth. The
most stunning example is Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum), Kerala, which boasts
a skilled labor force and a natural harbor but has almost no FDI. With a new state
government declaring its intention to begin attracting FDI, it is quite likely that FDI-
led exports from Kerala will begin to grow. Other coastal cities that could be much
more dynamic include Cochin, also in Kerala; Bhubaneshwar, the capital city of
Orissa; and Vishakhapatnam, the major port of Andhra Pradesh.
The reasons why these other coastal port cities have not rapidly developed are nu-
merous. The continuing power of the central government over regional infrastruc-
ture (airports, major highways, power, and telecommunications) has certainly re-
duced the capacity of state governments to implement rapid economic reforms. In
China, provincial governments have had ample leeway to make key infrastructure
investments; in India, the powerful monopoly state enterprises in key infrastructure
sectors have resisted competition, especially from potential foreign investors. This is
changing, but gradually and not without continued resistance.
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India, like China but unlike the United States, boasts several cities with populations
greater than 1 million that are far from the coast or navigable waterways.19 Lucknow
(Uttar Pradesh), Kanpur (Uttar Pradesh), Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), and
Bangalore (Karnataka) are 100–500 km from the sea; and Delhi, Jaipur (Rajasthan),
Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh), and Nagpur (Maharashtra) are 500–1,000 km from the
sea. These Indian cities can readily support industry for the internal market, as well
as IT-based services. Moreover, with a new high-quality internal highway system
between these major cities, even these inland urban areas could become export ori-
ented. Establishing improved transport and communications networks (including
 ber-optic cables) among the major cities is a high priority.
India will likely continue to face the same problems as China in the inland areas,
particularly the inland rural areas. Even with faster overall growth, the inland areas
are likely to grow more slowly than the coastal areas, which is likely to provoke po-
litical pressures and to increase internal migration from rural areas to cities and
from the interior to the coast. India, however, may have an advantage over China in
that the westernmost regions of China are much farther from the coast than India’s
heavily populated interior regions of the Gangetic valley. China has four cities of
more than 1 million that are more than 1,000 km from the coast (Chengdu, Lanzhou,
Urumqi, and Xian), whereas India has none.
As in China, a careful balance will have to be struck between two kinds of invest-
ments in the rural hinterland (e.g., in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar): physical infrastruc-
ture, such as roads, rail, airports, and telecommunications, to bring these regions
closer to the international markets; and investments in human capital, mainly edu-
cation and health, to raise the productivity of the rural population. The latter invest-
ments may serve to attract new  rms eager to bene t from an increasingly skilled la-
bor force, or they may provoke large-scale migration to more economically vibrant
coastal regions.  Either way, the currently impoverished populations would bene t
from rising living standards, wherever in India they are enjoyed.
Appendix
Data sources and description
Our data cover the period 1980–98 in 14 major states of India. The states not in-
cluded are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Chattisgarh, Delhi, Goa, Himachal Pradesh,
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19 Eleven U.S. cities with populations of 1 million or more are remote from the coast, but in all
cases except Dallas they are close to a navigable waterway.  These large interior cities are
Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dallas, Detroit, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Pitts-
burgh, Portland, and St. Louis.
Jharkhand, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Pondicherry, Uttaranchal, and Sikkim.
Data are not available for these states over a large number of years. The data used
for analyzing income convergence or divergence among Indian states are from In-
dian of cial statistical publications. Various volumes of the Central Statistical Orga-
nization (CSO) publications provided the estimates of SDP. The concept of SDP used
in the paper is based on income originating in the state rather than income accruing
to the state.
The primary sector consists of agriculture and allied activities, and the  shery, for-
estry, and mining and quarrying subsectors. The secondary sector includes manu-
facturing, construction, electricity, gas, and water supply. The tertiary sector com-
prises transport, communication, storage, hotels and restaurants,  nance and real
estate, banking and insurance, public administration, community and personal ser-
vices, and other services. We have used the share of the primary sector in SDP to
measure the changes in the economic structure and their effect on growth. By total
population we mean the total number of people in the state as of the end of a partic-
ular year. CSO data on state-wise real capita SDP are arrived at by using total popu-
lation along with SDP de ated by the base year prices.
Some of the data are from the Sample Registration System (SRS) of the Registrar
General, India. The SRS is a large-scale demographic sample survey that provides
reliable annual estimates of the birth rate, death rate, and other fertility and mortal-
ity indicators at the state and national levels and for rural and urban areas. By pro-
viding age-speci c mortality rates, SRS data also facilitate the construction of life ta-
bles at birth and at selected ages for the above disaggregated categories, including
those for males and females separately. The age composition of the population from
two successive censuses provides data for the construction of decadal life tables, but
the SRS alone provides trends in life expectancy at more frequent intervals (annually
in recent years).
The SRS uses a dual-record system for collection of data. First, continuous enumera-
tion of births and deaths is undertaken by a part-time resident enumerator. Second,
an independent retrospective survey every six months is conducted by a computer
supervisor. The data obtained through these two processes are matched. The un-
matched and partially matched events are re-veri ed in the  eld, and thereafter an
unduplicated count of births and deaths is obtained. This procedure is said to elimi-
nate errors of duplication and allow a quantitative assessment of sources of distor-
tion in the two sets of records; that is, it ensures a cross-check on the correctness and
completeness of the data collected. The SRS was introduced in 1969–70, after the ab-
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sence of dependable data from the Civil Registration System began to be felt in the
middle of the 1960s.
Data on the level of investment in individual states comparable with the investment
data at the national level obtained from the national accounts are simply not avail-
able.
Technical appendix
There are 14 states (N = 14): 8 are in group I (n1 = 8) and 6 are in group II (n2 = 6).
Variance20 is calculated as follows:































where xi is the log of real GSDP per capita. We proceed to add and subtract the
means within group I and group II, denoted x1 and x2, respectively. Some of the














































































In our sample, the constants yield an equation of the form
0.538Var(group I) + 0.385Var(group II) + 0.264Var(average between groups).
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